

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE**

KYLE SKINNER,	)	
	)	
Plaintiff,	)	
	)	
v.	)	Civil Action No. 24-848-MN
	)	
OFFICER CHRISTOPHER NIKITUK,	)	
	)	
Defendant.	)	

**REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION**

Plaintiff Kyle Skinner (“Plaintiff”) filed this action on July 22, 2024, alleging violations of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (D.I. 2) He appears *pro se* and has been granted leave to proceed *in forma pauperis*. (D.I. 6) The court proceeds to review and screen the matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) and 1915A(a). For the reasons set forth below, the court recommends the complaint be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

**I. BACKGROUND**

Plaintiff alleges violations of his rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments and asserts a state law claim for violations of Delaware’s dash camera and body-worn camera policies. The events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred during a traffic stop on January 2, 2021, when Officer Christopher Nikituk pulled Plaintiff over in a patrol vehicle that did not have dash cameras. Nikituk asked Plaintiff to exit his vehicle and then searched the vehicle, which led to the discovery of marijuana. According to the complaint, Plaintiff’s cell phone and \$493.00 were also seized during the search.

Plaintiff was arrested and charged with failure to use a turn signal, failure to have a valid license, turning without a signal, possession of drug paraphernalia, and two counts of possession of a controlled substance. Plaintiff was placed in jail at the New Castle County Police

Department and was subsequently released on bail. As a result of Nikituk's actions, Plaintiff alleges that he was engaged in court proceedings to fight the criminal charges for a period of two years. Plaintiff ultimately prevailed in court, and all charges were dismissed following a suppression hearing.

## II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A federal court may properly dismiss an action *sua sponte* under the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b) if “the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” *Ball v. Famiglio*, 726 F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir. 2013); *see also* 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (*in forma pauperis* actions); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (actions in which prisoner seeks redress from a governmental defendant); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (prisoner actions brought with respect to prison conditions). The court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to a *pro se* plaintiff. *See Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny*, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008); *Erickson v. Pardus*, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). Because Plaintiff proceeds *pro se*, his pleading is liberally construed and his complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” *Erickson*, 551 U.S. at 94 (citations omitted).

An action is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A complaint is not automatically frivolous because it fails to state a claim. *See Dooley v. Wetzel*, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020). Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and 1915A(b)(1), a court may dismiss a complaint as frivolous if it depends on an “indisputably meritless legal theory” or a “clearly baseless” or “fantastic or delusional” factual scenario. *Dooley*, 957 F.3d at 374 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1) is identical to the legal standard used when deciding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motions. *See Tourscher v. McCullough*, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). However, before dismissing a complaint or claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A, the court must grant a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. *See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp.*, 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).

A complaint may be dismissed only if, accepting the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court concludes that those allegations “could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief.” *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007). Though “detailed factual allegations” are not required, a complaint must do more than simply provide “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” *Davis v. Abington Mem’l Hosp.*, 765 F.3d 236, 241 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show that a claim has substantive plausibility. *See Johnson v. City of Shelby*, 574 U.S. 10, 12 (2014). A complaint may not be dismissed for imperfect statements of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted. *See id.* at 10.

Under the pleading regime established by *Twombly* and *Iqbal*, a court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps: (1) take note of the elements the plaintiff must plead to state a claim; (2) identify allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth; and (3) when there are well-pleaded factual allegations, assume their veracity and determine whether they plausibly give rise to an

entitlement to relief. *See Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp.*, 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016); *see also Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Deciding whether a claim is plausible will be a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” *Id.*

### III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff's claims are time-barred. For purposes of the statute of limitations, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims are characterized as personal injury actions. *See O'Connor v. City of Newark*, 440 F.3d 125, 126-27 (3d Cir. 2006). In Delaware, Section 1983 claims are subject to a two-year limitations period. *See 10 Del. C. § 8119; Smith v. Delaware*, 236 F. Supp. 3d 882, 888 (D. Del. 2017). Section 1983 claims accrue “when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which its action is based.” *Samerica Corp. v. City of Phila.*, 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998).

The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that generally must be raised by the defendant, and it is waived if not properly raised. *See Benak ex rel. Alliance Premier Growth Fund v. Alliance Capital Mgmt. L.P.*, 435 F.3d 396, 400 n.14 (3d Cir. 2006); *Fassett v. Delta Kappa Epsilon*, 807 F.2d 1150, 1167 (3d Cir. 1986). “Although the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, *sua sponte* dismissal is appropriate when ‘the defense is obvious from the face of the complaint and no further factual record is required to be developed.’ ” *Davis v. Gauby*, 408 F. App'x 524, 526 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting *Fogle v. Pierson*, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006)). Accordingly, a court may dismiss a time-barred complaint *sua sponte* under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

Plaintiff alleges the wrongful act occurred on January 2, 2021. Plaintiff filed this action on July 22, 2024. It is evident from the face of the complaint that all claims are barred by the

two-year limitations period as they occurred prior to July 22, 2022. Because Plaintiff's allegations are time-barred, I recommend that the court dismiss with prejudice Plaintiff's § 1983 claim. Amendment is futile.

#### IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, I recommend that the court issue an Order in the form set forth below:

#### ORDER

At Wilmington this \_\_th day of \_\_\_\_, 2025, IT IS ORDERED that:

1. The Report and Recommendation issued on April 4, 2025 is **ADOPTED**.
2. The complaint is **DISMISSED with prejudice** pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1).

This Report and Recommendation is filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1), and D. Del. LR 72.1. Any objections to the Report and Recommendation shall be limited to ten (10) double-spaced pages and filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). The failure of a party to object to legal conclusions may result in the loss of the right to *de novo* review in the district court. *See Henderson v. Carlson*, 812 F.2d 874, 878-79 (3d Cir. 1987); *Sincavage v. Barnhart*, 171 F. App'x 924, 925 n.1 (3d Cir. 2006).

The parties are directed to the court's Standing Order for Objections Filed Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, dated March 7, 2022, a copy of which is available on the court's website, <http://www.ded.uscourts.gov>.

Dated: April 4, 2025



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Sherry R. Fallon  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE